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Structural Realism (SR) is a moderate variant of scientific realism and can roughly be 
captured by the idea that we should be committed in the structural rather than object-like 
content of our best current scientific theories. A quick view on the list of some of the main 
proponents shows that SR is basically a European philosophy of science movement (and 
just suits our ESF Programme): John Worrall, Ioannis Votsis, Steven French, Angelo Cei, 
James Ladyman, Simon Saunders, Michael Esfeld, Vincent Lam, Katherine Brading, Mauro 
Dorato, Dean Rickles,  Fred Muller, and – exceptions prove the rule – Anjan Chakravartty 
and John Stachel. The list is of course not exhaustive, moreover, the debate has a broad 
periphery. A notable example is for instance Bas van Fraassen’s structural empiricism. 
 
The paper is a kind of opinionated review paper. In what follows I will pass through the 
most prevailing topics in recent debates over SR. My discussion will be organised, perhaps 
a bit unorthodoxly, in short sections, here and then I will outline my own views. 
 
 
1  The notion of structure 
 
The notion of structure is notoriously vague, and this is already one of the many problems 
of SR. The notion is of course not vague as far as the abstract mathematical concept of 
structure is concerned. Compare, for instance, Shapiro (2000): “Define a system to be a 
collection of objects with certain relations among them. [...] Define a pattern or structure to be the 
abstract form of the system, highlighting the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any 
features of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system.” The 
mathematical definition has it that there are entities, the relata, that come equipped with a 
structure, but that the relata are determined by structural or relational properties only. 
Hence, a good working definition for SR is that structures are sets of objects, domains, 
with sets of relations imposed on them. 
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 The problem is that despite the mathematical definition there exists no practical, 
straightforward method to extract the structural content from a given scientific theory. The 
problem is obvious as far as non-formalized theories in the higher special sciences are 
concerned, but it prevails even regarding fundamental physical theories. In this paper I do 
not delve into this problem, but I will mostly take the symmetry structure as the primary, 
genuine candidate to characterize the structural content of modern physical theories. 
 
 
2  Two routes to Structural Realism 
 
SR has a longstanding tradition in the 20th century and even earlier. There is consensus 
that the modern debate was initiated by John Worrall (1989). The discussion of the last two 
decades has actually taken two routes to SR, the Worrall-type and French-Ladyman-type 
route, as I prefer to call them. Worrall, Votsis (2003) and others gave arguments in favour 
of SR from the philosophy of science – for instance by arguing that SR’s commitment to 
structure and not object-like content can be used as an antidote against prominent anti-
realistic arguments like the pessimistic meta-induction or theory underdetermination. 
French-Ladyman-type authors, on the other hand, try to present arguments from the 
sciences directly, more precisely from the way modern science, notably physics, informs 
us about the ontology of the world. Meanwhile, all major fields of modern physics have 
been considered to strengthen arguments in favour of a structural ontology: Quantum 
Mechanics (French and Ladyman 2003a, Esfeld 2004), Quantum Field Theory (Cao 2003, 
Saunders 2003), General Relativity (Dorato 2000, Esfeld and Lam 2008, Stachel 2002), 
Gauge Theories (Lyre 2004a,b), Quantum Gravity (Rickles etal. 2006) or physics in general 
(Muller 1998, Redhead 2001). Note that the distinction between the two routes is not the 
same as the ESR/OSR distinction (see below). Cao (2003), for instance, proposes French-
Ladyman-type ESR. 
 
 
3   Ante rem versus in re structuralism 
 
Debates on structuralism in mathematics show a similarity to structuralism in science, but 
must ultimately be separated from them. Shapiro (2000) is for instance known to uphold 
an ante rem structuralist position in the philosophy of mathematics, i.e. a Platonist 
conception of the existence of structures prior to and independent of their exemplification 
in the physical world. French and Ladyman (2003b) made it sufficiently clear that SR 
should not be confused with Platonism but is explicitly intended as a realism about 
structures not as abstract entities but as in re structures in the physical world. 
 
 
4   Epistemic, Ontic and Semantic SR 
 
As is well-known, James Ladyman (1998) first coined the distinction between  Epistemic 
and Ontic SR. While ESR proponents believe in the structural content of theories as an 
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 epistemic constraint and, hence, uphold the view that objects may exist, but that our 
epistemic access is restricted to structures only, OSR proponents, according to Ladyman, 
take structure to be primitive and ontologically subsistent. I think, however, the 
distinction should be a bit more refined. In line with the usual threefold distinction 
between epistemic, ontic and semantic forms of scientific realism, we may accordingly 
distinguish between the following three options: 
 Epistemic SR: science conveys true knowledge about structures, 
 Semantic SR: the contents and terms of scientific theories refer to structures, 
 Ontic SR: structures exist independently (from our epistemic and linguistic 
capacities). 
 
 
5   Eliminative and non-eliminative SR 
 
What’s generally unfortunate with the above distinctions is the fact that everything still 
depends on our proper understanding of the term “structure”. Given the mathematical 
definition of structure as sets of objects or relata with sets of relations imposed on them, 
there are, on the face of it, three possibilities: 
 Epistemic SR: there are relations and relata, but that we have epistemic access to 
relations only, 
 Non-eliminative OSR: there are relations and relata, but that there is nothing more 
to the relata than the relations in which they stand, 
 Eliminative OSR: there are only relations and no relata. 
Note that under this classification the widely debated question whether the slogan 
“structure is all there is” leads to the problematic position of “relations without relata” 
does not depend on Ladyman’s ESR/OSR distinction, but rather on the distinction between 
non-eliminative versus eliminative versions of SR. It is perfectly possible to uphold SR as a 
metaphysical position about the world without being vulnerable to the “relations without 
relata”-problem. Well-known proponents of eliminative OSR are, or at least have initially 
been, Steven French and James Ladyman (French and Ladyman 2003a, French 2006, 
Ladyman and Ross 2007), a proponent of non-eliminative (or moderate) OSR is Michael 
Esfeld (2004). 
 
 
6   Structurally derived intrinsic properties 
 
I do actually believe that the above threefold distinction is still not exhaustive. General 
considerations about symmetry structures enforce us to assume the existence of not only 
relational but (in a certain sense) intrinsic properties of the relata. Technically speaking, a 
symmetry of a domain D is a set of one-to-one mappings of D onto itself (a.k.a. symmetry 
transformations), such that the structure of D is preserved. The symmetry transformations 
form a group and exemplify equivalence relations (i.e. a partitioning of D into equivalence 
classes). Naturally and necessarily, we always get certain invariants under a given 
symmetry. In a physical context, such invariants provide properties shared by all members 
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 of D. These properties are intrinsic properties in the sense that they belong to any member 
of D irrespectively of the existence of other object-like entities. On the other hand, the 
invariant properties do not suffice to individuate the members, since all members share 
the same invariant properties in a given domain. Structure invariants do not lead to 
individuals but to object classes only. This highlights the importance of the invariants: we 
use them to individuate domains, not individuals. 
 
Now a crucial point: insofar as they are structural invariants, the intrinsic properties 
`depend’ (in a sense still to be determined) on the structure, we should accordingly and 
properly consider them as “structurally derived intrinsic properties”. Nevertheless, they 
are intrinsic rather than relational, since they subsist irrespectively of the existence of other 
object-like entities.  
 
 
7   Intermediate SR 
 
We are thus left with an even more moderate non-eliminative version of SR which I shall 
dub “Intermediate SR” (cf. Lyre 2009).  It is the view that there are relata and structurally 
derived properties, but that there is nothing more to the relata than the structurally 
derived properties, where the structurally derived properties comprise relational 
properties and invariants of structure as structurally derived intrinsic properties. Note 
further that this is still a viable SR position and does not collapse to old fashioned entity 
realism, since neither are we committed to essential properties nor are we committed to 
individuals (see below). Structurally derived properties do not individuate objects but 
object classes or domains of structure only. 
 
 
8  An illustration: the lone electron 
 
The following Gedankenexperiment provides an illustration of the particular nature of 
structurally derived intrinsic properties: Suppose a possible world with one electron only 
(and with relational spacetime). Does the lone electron possess an elementary charge? 
Under the classic view that intrinsic properties are properties an object has of itself and 
independently of the existence of other objects, the lone electron has very well a charge. It 
seems, however, that for proponents of both eliminative and moderate OSR, who accept 
relational properties only, a lone electron cannot have a charge, since there are no other 
objects left in virtue of which the electron’s charge might be considered as relational. From 
the point of view of Intermediate SR as another non-eliminative version including 
structurally derived intrinsic properties there is no problem to apply charges to lone 
objects.  For even in the trivial case of only one member in D, the object will possess the 
said symmetry-invariant properties. The object has the invariance properties in virtue of 
the structure, the structure comes equipped with such properties. In more physical terms: 
even a lone electron is a proper instantiation of the in re U(1) gauge structure. 
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 But couldn’t we just say that the charge is relational to the structure? The problem is that 
in this case one cannot exclude the possibility that the structure as a relatum of the 
exemplification relation can exist for itself. Hence, one opens the door to unexemplified 
structures – a clear renunciation of in re structuralism and a dangerous flirt with 
Platonism. 
 
 
9  A further argument: gauge invariants 
 
The importance of structural invariants – structurally derived intrinsic properties – can 
most clearly be seen from the most important case of symmetry structure in modern 
physics, the case of gauge theoretic structures. One crucial feature of gauge symmetries is 
that they possess no real instantiations. Note that we must carefully distinguish between 
symmetries with real instantiations as opposed to symmetries without real instantiations. 
Examples of the former are for instance the possible space-time transformations of a 
physical object. Examples of the latter are scale transformations, coordinate 
transformations, and, in particular, gauge transformations. Therefore, a gauge theoretic 
characterization of a physical theory is a fortiori all and only a characterization by means of 
the symmetry invariants, since only the gauge symmetry invariants allow for a realistic 
interpretation. Gauge transformations do possess no real instantiations (cf. Lyre 2004a,b). 
In the case of gauge theories, the SR commitment to structure can only be a commitment to 
the structure invariants. These invariants are given by the eigenvalues of the Casimir 
operators of the various gauge groups, which in their physical interpretation are 
considered to be mass, spin and the various charges. In fact, mass, spin, and charge 
provide paradigmatic cases of intrinsic properties of elementary particles. They are the 
attributes by which we classify the fundamental particle zoo. They are, in fact, the most 
fundamental structurally derived intrinsic properties. 
 
 
10  Identity, haecceitism and metaphysical underdetermination 
 
Another “structural attack” on traditional entity realism has to do with issues about 
identity and individuality in modern physics, notably quantum mechanics. The empirical 
indistinguishability of quantum objects has originally been regarded as a failure of 
Leibniz’ principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII). French (1989, 1998), however, 
argues that we are rather left with a kind of „metaphysical underdetermination“: either 
quantum objects violate PII and are no individuals, or they are individuals since PII 
applies by reference to some kind of primitive thisness, bare particularity or haecceity (or 
however we may call it). The deeper lesson is that science leaves even the most profound 
metaphysical question about individuality underdetermined and so, following French, we 
better give up entity realism altogether and stick with a structural ontology. Obviously, 
this line of reasoning paves the way to eliminative OSR. 
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 11  Weak discernibles 
 
Saunders (2006) has argued that although fermions are not absolutely discernible (in terms 
of intrinsic monadic properties), they are nevertheless weakly discernible. Indeed, this 
observation can be seen as supporting structural non-eliminativism (and to give up 
haecceitism). To make this claim plausible consider first Black’s case of two equal spheres 
in relational space with, say, one mile distance. Do such spheres violate PII? Call objects 
that violate PII absolutely discernible, but objects which allow for irreflexive relations 
weakly discernible (Quine 1976). Recall that a relation R is reflexive when for all x in the 
domain R(x,x) holds. In the case of ¬R(x,x), R is called irreflexive. For instance each Black 
sphere is one mile apart from the other but not from itself. So the distance relation is 
irreflexive. The same holds in the case of fermionic particles in an entangled state for the 
relation of having opposite spin. Fred Muller (in print) has recently even extended this 
result to particles irrespective of their spin by considering the Heisenberg “commutation 
relation” of having complementary position and momentum. We may say that quantum 
objects are in fact generally weakly discernible due to the possibility of canonically 
conjugate variables based on the non-commutative algebra structure of quantum theory. 
 
The case of weak discernibles accounts for the existence of relata that are weakly 
individuated by irreflexive relations. It runs counter to relata-eliminativism, but does at 
the same time not endorse full entity realism of absolute individuals. Indeed, irreflexive 
relations are structurally derived relations in the sense that they reflect the allowed 
quantum states of the non-commutative algebra structure. As in the case of structurally 
derived intrinsic properties, they are ontologically on a par with the structure without 
presupposing the independent existence of either the structure or the properties (or  the 
relata). Rather, they are in re exemplifications of the structure. 
 
 
12  The problem of unintended domains 
 
Let’s come to some more intricate problems of SR. Reconsider the idea of structure 
invariants as derived intrinsic properties. The crucial question is whether and how we will 
ever know about such properties as intrinsic natures of objects. Taken literally, the idea to 
individuate theories by means of their pure structural content is far too weak. The reason 
lies in what one might call the “problem of unintended domains”. There are in fact lots of 
cases where distinct physical theories show basically the same structural content, unless 
we do not qualify the structure’s domain. Here are some physics examples of such 
“structural equivalents”: (i) classical electrodynamics and hydrodynamics are based on 
more or less the same mathematical apparatus about unspecified `currents’ including 
continuity equations, theorems of Gauss and Stokes etc.; (ii) the gauge theories of strong 
and weak isospin are both based on SU(2); (iii) the group U(1) figures in quantum physics 
both as the group of temporal automorphisms and as the gauge group of QED. 
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 Surely we’ve said that the domains are individuated by the structure invariants as derived 
intrinsic properties, but so far we did not spell out whether and how they provide an 
independent way to make contact with such invariant properties. Let’s leave this open for 
the moment and discuss some further related issues first. 
 
 
13  Structural underdetermination 
 
We may exercabate the problem of unintended domains to the problem of structural 
underdetermination. According to the Worrall-type route to SR (as mentioned in section 
2), SR can be seen as an antidote against theory underdetermination (TUD). The idea is 
that while TUD undermines entity content, SR seems to avoid this by not committing us to 
the theory’s entity content but to structural content only. However, as I’ve argued 
elsewhere (Lyre, in print), there is, on the face of it, no way to make sure that the structural 
content of theories is not underdetermined either. On the contrary, there seem to exist 
cases in our best fundamental science, notably in theories of gravity, where we are directly 
confronted with cases of structural TUD. This means that we are confronted with 
structurally inequivalent but empirically equivalent theories. In such cases the structure of 
a theory is underdetermined by empirical evidence. 
 
 
14  The Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis-account of theoretical terms 
 
We may reiterate and generalize the two problems mentioned above. In order to do so we 
must reconsider the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis-account of theoretical terms (cf. Lewis 1970). 
As a variant of scientific realism, SR is a realism about the unobservable. Take the classic 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms oi and ti. The Ramsey sentence of a 
theory T can be understood as a machinery for expressing the structural content of T. It is 
obtained by replacing the theoretical terms of T with bound variables: T(t1,…tn, o1,…,om) → 
∃x1,…∃xn T(x1,…xn; o1,…om). Under such an account the theoretical terms are not 
eliminated but are expressed in terms of the structural relations between the variables xi in 
T. The Ramsey sentence leaves us with a pure structural description of the theoretical 
knowledge about the world. The early Russell and Carnap took this as a motivation to 
uphold an extreme epistemic structuralism. 
 
 
15  Multiple realizability, quidditism and Ramseyan Humility 
 
Multiple realizability is in fact an immediate consequence of the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis-
account of theoretical terms. Our knowledge about the referents of the theoretical terms is 
just knowledge about the occupants or placeholders of descriptive causal roles. The 
quiddistic nature of the placeholders is indetermined, they are thus multiply realizable. A 
possible consequence is to advocate Ramseyan Humility about quiddities. 
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 Recall that haecceitism is the view that a permutation of individuals (or tokens) makes a 
difference. It amounts to assume primitive thisness. We’ve already seen that SR, clearly in 
its non-eliminativist branch, dismisses haecceitism (section 10). Quidditism, on the other 
hand, is the view that a permuation of properties (or types) makes a difference. It amounts 
to assume primitive suchness. So structuralists usually reject haecceitism, but should they 
reject quidditism as well? 
 
The problem not only for SR but in fact for any variant of scientific realism which commits 
itself to the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis-account of theoretical terms is that quidditism amounts 
to making a difference without a difference. There are, on the face of it, two answers the 
realist might have: “so what?” and direct acquaintance. In following the first answer, 
David Lewis (2009) subscribes to quidditism, but at the same time advocates Ramseyan 
Humility, a term he has borrowed from Rae Langton’s (1998) Kantian Humility. Kantian 
Humility, in turn, should capture Kant’s view that things as we know them, phenomena, 
consist entirely of relations and that we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of 
things in themselves. So following Langton Kant’s attitude is no idealism, but rather an 
epistemic humility. Accordingly, Ramseyan Humility is the view that “no amount of 
knowledge about what roles are occupied will tell us which properties occupy which roles” (Lewis 
2009, p. 204). 
 
A second answer to the problem of quidditism is that we might nevertheless be in contact 
with quiddistic natures, i.e. to advocate a more direct realism than suggested by the 
indirect causal and nomological knowledge provided by the Ramsey sentence (see also 
Schaffer 2005). And there might even be a third stance as regards quidditism, namely 
simply to dismiss it as an exaggerated metaphysics while at the same time claiming this to 
be a viable realist answer despite its apparent empiricist flavor. I will make no further 
attempt here to decide which way to go (in part also since, again, the problem is not 
special to SR but affects realism in toto). 
 
 
16  The Newman problem 
 
As is well-known, Max Newman (1928) raised a serious objection against Russell’s (1927) 
early version of SR (see Demopoulos and Friedman (1989) for a modern resumption). The 
idea is that if abstract structure is all we can know from our theories about the 
unobservable world, then only cardinality questions are open to empirical discovery. As 
Newman (1928, 140) put it: “…given any ‘aggregate’ A, a system of relations between its 
members can be found having any assigned structure compatible with the cardinal number of A”. 
And further: “… the doctrine that only structure is known involves the doctrine that nothing can 
be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of existence, except ("theoretically") the 
number of constituting objects.” So structuralism is near-vacuous, in effect it collapses to 
empiricism. All we can know is just cardinality. 
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 The point of the Newman problem is not only that relations do not suffice to pick out the 
intrinsic nature of the objects in the domain, but that also the nature of the relations 
themselves remains indetermined! According to the early Russell only abstract 
mathematical structure is known. But without further empirical qualification, any such 
abstract structure can be imposed on a given set (modulo cardinality constraints). 
 
In a sense, the Newman problem is the inverse of multiple realizability. Whereas in the 
latter case we have multiple instantiations (collections of entities) that fit the structural 
description, Newman’s problem amounts to saying that a given collection of entities can 
be endowed with any arbitrary structure, as long as the collection has the right cardinality. 
As van Fraassen (2008) has pointed out, Newman’s problem shows an interesting 
similarity to Putnam’s model-theoretic problem, but we shall not delve into the details of 
disentangling them here. 
 
 
17  Four problems revisited 
 
We’ve discovered four problems in connection with SR: unintended domains (section 12), 
structural underdetermination (13), multirealization (15) and Newman’s problem (16). 
They actually come in pairs. While the first pair has to do with the practical and vague 
notion of structure in physical theories (for instance the symmetry structure given by the 
symmetry groups in physics), the latter pair has to do with the precise logico-
mathematical structure of a theory (cf. section 1). The difference is that the symmetry 
structure of T is most certainly not exhaustive, since the complete structure of T is almost 
certainly more extensive. By way of contrast, the logico-mathematical structure of the 
Ramsey sentence is exhaustive, insofar as the Ramsey sentence of a theory provides a 
complete description of T. Despite this distinction, problems 12 and 15 as well as 13 and 16 
are more or less variations of the same theme – with 12 and 13 as special practical cases of 
the more generalized abstract cases 15 and 16. It is not at all implausible to assume that all 
four problems (or at least three, structural TUD is perhaps more special) are so strongly 
connected that they seek for a common answer. And basically, there are two routes from 
here, a Humean and an anti-Humean route, as I shall outline in the final sections. 
 
 
18  Modal structures 
 
Several SR proponents in recent debates have argued in favour of modal or causal 
structures (Chakravartty 2004, 2007; Esfeld (in print); Ladyman & Ross 2007). This means 
that structures are conceived as dispositional rather than categorical. The basic idea, 
notably in Chakravartty (2004), is to endow structures themselves with causal powers. 
Esfeld (in print) considers this an inevitable step in order to cope with the problem of 
quidditism (section 15). Others even see this as a possible way to overcome Newman’s 
problem. Russell’s early structuralism was about abstract structures, not about concrete in 
re structures. It is, in other words, about second and not first order relations. To overcome 
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 Newman’s problem the structuralist might just consider first order relations with causal 
powers as instantiations of abstract structures. 
 
This strategy is perhaps a way out of the conundrum of problems 12 and 16 in particular. 
But, as usual, one has to pay a price. The strategy includes a double-step: first, to invoke 
first order relations and, second, to invoke causal powers. And the second step portrays a 
decisive non-Humean element, the allegedly modal or dispositional nature of structures. 
There are well-known difficulties connected with modal or dispositional ontologies, 
notably unclear identity conditions, which I shall not explore here. Rather, my project will 
be to outline the perspectives of SR from a strict Humean point of view. 
 
 
19  A Humean response to Newman 
 
Confronted with Newman’s objection, Russell immediately realized that he must refine his 
position. In order to justify a particular, intended structure, we must somehow be directly 
acquainted with certain structural relations. Russell thus demanded “spatiotemporal 
copunctuality” between sense-data and physical objects as a basic relation. I cannot not 
discuss here whether Russell’s proposal of spatiotemporal copunctuality is already the 
correct answer to the quest for basic relations, but I want to emphasize that his idea of 
knowledge about structures by acquaintance rather than mere description is, in principle, 
a viable solution to the notorious problems 12 and 16, perhaps even 15. It is, in fact, a 
solution which is also open for modern proponents of SR paving the way for a Humean 
conception of SR. 
 
The essential clue is that we are not bound to relational properties only. For as we have 
already seen, SR must take structurally derived intrinsic properties into account (sections 
6-9). We might therefore envisage direct observational acquaintance with structurally 
derived intrinsic properties. Whether and which placeholders of a structural description 
exist, i.e. whether and how a structure is instantiated, is an empirical question. And 
whether it is, for instance, electrical current or currents of certain fluids has to be 
distinguished on the level of observational phenomena and cannot be known from the 
pure theoretical and structural content alone (given the structural equivalence of the 
mathematical accounts). In our experimental observations we make (more or less) “direct” 
contact with the categorical, structurally derived intrinsic nature of the currents. That way 
Newman’s problem vanishes. Note, moreover, that weakly discernible relations are 
perfectly categorical: they do not involve any quantum probabilities. 
 
 
20  Humean perspectives on structural realism 
 
A proper Humean perspective on SR is to demand categorical structures and to dismiss 
mysterious modalities (cf. Sparber 2009 for an account similar in spirit). Humean 
metaphysics, as usually construed, is based on at least three conditions: 
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 1. a micro-physicalist supervenience base of fundamental intrinsic and categorical 
properties, 
2. regularity (i.e. non-necessitarian) view about laws, and 
3. reductionism about laws. 
In an attempt to combine Humean metaphysics with SR, at least one of the three 
conditions must be changed. Let us consider them subsequently in the following sections. 
 
 
21  Subvenient holistic structures  
 
The first condition is best characterized in Lewis’ famous conception of Humean 
supervenience, his view of “the world [as] a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact” with 
“no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that“ 
(Lewis 1986, ix-x). Meanwhile however, it is widely accepted that Humean supervenience 
is bound to fail. It fails according to modern science – according to the cases of quantum 
entanglement and gauge theoretic holism (cf. Healey 2007, chap. 4.5; Lyre 2004b; Maudlin 
2007, chap. 2). Lewis even acknowledges the threat of quantum entanglement: “maybe the 
lesson of Bell's theorem is exactly that there are physical entities which are unlocalized, and which 
might therefore make a difference between worlds … that match perfectly in their arrangements of 
local qualities. Maybe so. I'm ready to believe it. But I am not ready to take lessons in ontology from 
quantum physics as it now is. First I must see how it looks when it is purified of instrumentalist 
frivolity… and—most of all—… of supernatural tales about the power of the observant mind to 
make things jump. If, after all that, it still teaches nonlocality, I shall submit willingly to the best of 
authority.” But whether the quantum measurement problem has to do with frivolity or not 
– since the case of nonlocality can be made in gauge theories as well (a fact Lewis was 
obviously not aware of), it is time to realize that Humean supervenience must definitely be 
given up. 
 
For proponents of Humean SR this is no bad news, since it is exactly this condition about 
the Lewisean Humean base which must be rejected. Instead of a mosaic of intrinsic, 
categorical properties, Humean SR considers whole structures in the supervenience base. 
This is a dismissal of naïve micro-physicalism, not about the categorical nature of such 
structures. Structures are holistic and global rather than local entities, physically 
exemplified and manifestly categorical. There is no need to assume causal structures, as 
we already saw in the discussion of Newman’s problem and as we’ll see now in the 
discussion of the second Humean condition. 
 
 
22  Structural non-necessitarianism about laws  
 
Humean SR is actually in accordance with the second condition from section 20. Structures 
are not arbitrary, but regular global sets of relations. Hence – and this is a quite important 
point – regularity, the crucial ingredient of laws, is already entailed by invoking 
structures. Structures are law-like. Take, for instance, the Minkowski spacetime structure 
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 of special relativity. It is a global geodesic structure exemplified by the trajectories of free 
falling bodies – a seemingly regular behaviour. Moreover, the behaviour of a free particle 
to follow geodesics is no disposition of the particle, nor is it a disposition of the geodesic 
structure, it is an exemplification of the manifest, categorical in re structure of spacetime. 
The same holds for other fundamental structures, for instance, the U(1)-structure of the 
world being exemplified by charge conservation. 
 
Remarkably, such a structuralist regularity view about laws offers to avoid well-known 
problems of the orthodox regularity view. One problem is that not all regularities are law-
like. Indeed, not all regularities are laws, only structures are. Under Humean SR, 
structures should be conceived as “world-built-in patterns” or global regularities. The 
holistic aspect of structures is crucial here: the particle following a geodesic is not a 
subsequence of disparate events which, without further explanation, show a regular 
behaviour. It is an exemplification of a global regularity itself – the geodesic structure. 
 
There is, again, no reason to assume that there are “empty” laws. In re structuralism 
considers only exemplified structures. Such structures aren’t necessarily exemplified at 
any (world) time, but they are at least globally exemplified on the whole spacetime 
extension. This is perhaps the most straightforward way to think of exemplification in 
Humean structural worlds: consider a world in which only one particle at an 
infinitesimally small time period has travelled a likewise infinitesimal spatial path. This 
particle is a proper instantiation of the full spacetime structure of that possible world. 
 
Humean SR has furthermore the resources to explain the obvious universality of structure 
invariants without recourse to essentialism. Because of the holistic or global nature of 
structures, the structural invariants behave as universally valid. But such universality does 
not come equipped with mysterious necessity. It supervenes on the Humean base of 
structures. It is a mere regularity itself that some particular structure is instantiated. No 
necessities are involved here. 
 
It follows from the same logic that Humean SR can account for exceptionless laws. Any 
instantiation of a structure will show the same regular behaviour encoded in the structure. 
Exceptions must not be expected, unless, however, the whole structure itself changes. This 
latter possibility can of course not be ruled out. After all, structures provide the Humean 
base, whether a particular structure subsists or not is a matter of pure regularity itself. 
 
 
23  Non-realism about laws  
 
The idea that structures provide the Humean base guarantees that Humean SR is in 
accordance with the third condition from section 20. Laws are reduced to structures, laws 
supervene on the structural Humean base. Some might think that SR is committed to a 
realism about laws because of the following argument: according to SR structures are real 
and laws are structures, so laws must obviously be real too. But, as we’ve seen, Humean 
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 SR just considers structures as global regularities and items of the Humean base. So again: 
whether a particular structure subsists or not is a matter of pure regularity itself. Laws 
aren’t literally structures, and structures are only law-like in the sense that laws can be 
reduced to global regularities (which we call structures). 
 
 
24  Transfer theory of causation 
 
How should Humean structural realists finally construe causality? They might in fact 
welcome a transfer theory of causation (cf. Dowe 2000). The rough idea is that a causal 
process is the transmission of conserved quantities with causal interactions as intersections 
of such processes providing an exchange of the conserved quantities. According to 
fundamental physics, conserved quantities are identified with structural invariants. This is 
due to Noether’s theorem which states that to every continuous symmetry generated by 
local actions there corresponds a conserved quantity. Such conserved quantities and, in 
turn, the causal processes and interactions are exemplifications of the fundamental 
structures. Structures come equipped with conserved quantities. 
 
Some might complain that the transfer theory is non-Humean. But this is at best a problem 
for a mirco-physicalist Humean base (according to condition 1). If we consider whole 
structures in the Humean base then causal processes and transfer of conserved quantities 
supervene on that base. And this is all the Humean needs. 
 
  
25  Preliminary conclusion 
 
Sections 18 to 24 present arguments against causal structures and provide perspectives for 
a Humean SR. There is no need to endow structures with causal powers. What’s still 
missing in the picture is, perhaps, how dynamics comes into the world. We’ve basically 
outlined a static picture. And this is presumably the biggest neglect so far. Non-Humean 
SR with causal structures, however, doesn’t solve this problem either. Metaphysical 
causation and physical dynamics are distinct topics, proponents of causal structures have 
no better grip on dynamics than opponents. Here’s certainly much to be done in the 
future. 
 
Admittedly, this paper was largely programmatic. We could merely touch upon some few 
motives and perspectives on Humean SR. But the perspectives are quite promising, 
perhaps promising enough to pursue them in more elaborated examinations. 
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